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The Criminal Justice Act - 1964 To 1976
JUDGE DUDLEY B. BONSAL*
Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,1 the federal government
compensates attorneys for services rendered to certain federal criminal
defendants who are "financially unable to obtain adequate representa-
tion. ' 2 The Act is the culmination of years of study by Congress, the
Judiciary, and groups of the organized bar; it is based largely on the Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of
Federal Criminal Justice, known as the Allen Report.3
Supreme Court decisions have established the principle that in both
federal and state courts the right to be represented by an attorney is a
"fundamental right essential to a fair trial" under the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the Constitution. 4 Before the Act was passed, court-
assigned attorneys, who usually rendered their legal services pro bono
publico, provided the only representation for needy defendants. This
assignment system had proven inadequate to handle the increasing demand
for attorneys for those who could not afford to pay for such services.
Representation under the Act is provided to persons "financially
unable to obtain adequate representation" 5 or "financially unable to obtain
investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense. ' 6
The defendant, therefore, need not be "indigent." Accordingly, the Act
meets the realistic problem, sometimes overlooked, that even defendants
*United States District court for the Southern District of New York, and, since 1974,
Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act.
118 U.S.C. §3006A (1970 & Supp. V. 1975) (originally enactedas Pub. L. No.84-455, 78Stat.
552 (1964)) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
218 U.S.C. §3006A(a) (1970). Special appreciation is extended to Mr. William E. Foley,
Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. This article is derived
in large part from data supplied over the years by Mr. Foley and his staff to the Judicial
Conference of the United States and to the Judicial Conference Committee to Implement the
Criminal Justice Act. In addition, Mr. Foley's article, The Criminal Justice Act - Ten Years
Later, was of great assistance. Special appreciation is also extended to my law clerk Nancy E.
Friedman for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
Other articles written about the Criminal Justice Act are: Hastings, The Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 57 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 426 (1966); Kutak, The Criminal Justice Act of1964,44 NEB.
L. REV. 703 (1965); Woods, The Criminal Justice Act of 1964: A Study in Administrative Death,
AM. CRIM. L.Q. 54 (Winter 1967); Note, Judicial Perspectives on the Operation of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 55 (1967).
SATTORNEY GENERALS COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUsTIcE, F. A. ALLEN, CHAIRMAN, POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1963) [hereinafter cited as ALLEN REPORT].
'See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
518 U.S.C. §3006A(a) (1970).
618 U.S.C. §3006A(e)(1) (1970).
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with jobs and steady incomes may have fixed, unavoidable expenses which
make payment for an attorney or other legal assistance required in
connection with a trial impossible.
The 1967 Oaks Report7 recommended a number of amendments to the
Act. Some of these recommendations, which greatly broadened the scope
and application of the Act, were adopted by Congress in amending the Act
in 1970.8
For instance, the Act originally provided that attorneys could be
appointed from panels of private attorneys or attorneys "furnished" by a
local bar association or legal aid agency.9 One of the significant provisions
of the 1970 amendment was the creation of federal legal services offices
structured either as Federal Public Defenders offices, which were to be
organizationally patterned on the United States Attorneys Offices, or as
Community Defenders' offices, which are "non-profit defense counsel
services established and administered by any group authorized by the
[district court] plan to provide representation."1 0
Furthermore, the 1970 amendment substantially enlarged the coverage
of the Act. While the Act orginally provided for appointment of attorneys
only for "defendants charged with felonies or misdemeanors, other than
petty offenses." the 1970 amendment incorporated the concept that counsel
should be provided whenever a person was faced with the possibility of a
loss of liberty. Coverage was thereby extended to pre-arraignment proceed-
ings subsequent to arrest, many juvenile delinquency proceedings, proba-
tion violation proceedings, and generally to persons "for whom the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel, or in
a case in which he faces loss of liberty, any Federal law requires the
7D.H. OAKS, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, a study
published by the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (hereinafter referred to as the OAKS REPORT). See also Oaks,
Improving the Criminal Justice Act, 55 A.B.A.J. 217 (1969).
8See Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916 (Oct. 14, 1970).
9The Senate version of the Act (S. 1057) was passed on August 6, 1963 in substantially the
same form proposed by the ALLEN REPORT, see note 3 supra, which was the form in which it was
introduced. On January 15, 1964, the House of Representatives passed its version of the bill. On
August 7, 1964, the conferees of the Senate and the House agreed on a bill which did not contain
any provision for public defenders as provided in the Senate bill, but rather placed primary
reliance on a system of private counsel to be assigned on a case-by-case basis. This system was to
be supplemented by authorization of services furnished by attorneys voluntarily through bar
associations and legal aid agencies. The Act went into effect on August 20, 1965, one year after
its enactment.
Pursuant to the provision for the establishment of panels of attorneys to render assistance
under the Act, district courts adopted various procedures for selecting and maintaining their
panels. Some districts, such as the Northern District of Illinois, have relied on the Federal
Public Defender (since their creation pursuant to the 1970 amendment of the Act, see notes 46-
55 infra, & text accompanying, while other districts, such as the Southern District of New York,
use a committee of attorneys. Most plans seek to distribute appointments equitably and use
some form of a rotation system.
1018 U.S.C. §3006A(h)(2)(B) (1970).
[Vol. 52:135
1976] FEDERAL JUDICIARY 137
appointment of counsel."" In addition, district court judges are authorized
to appoint an attorney when the "interests of justice so require" for persons
who are subject to revocation of parole, in custody as a material witness,
seeking collateral relief (e.g. habeas corpus' 2 or section 2255 relief"), or
seeking findings subsequent to trial relating to their mental competency
at the time of trial. 14
The Act has now been in force for eleven years. The dramatic
expansion of its coverage is demonstrated by the growth in the number of
appointments and in the increase in its costs. For example, during fiscal
year 1967, the first full fiscal year of the Act's operation, 21,593 defendants
in the district courts and 1,008 appellants were assigned attorneys under the
Act. In fiscal year 1976, authorization for the appointment of attorneys has
been granted for more than 47,000 persons, and the records are not yet
complete. 5 For fiscal year 1966, Congress appropriated $3 million for
implementation and operation of the Act, and this sum proved to be more
than adequate. During fiscal year 1967, the average cost per case in the
district courts was $131, and per appeal was $384.16 In contrast, by fiscal
year 1976, Congress appropriated a total of $19,046,000 for operation of the
Act. 17 As of July 31, 1976, payments per case for district court representa-
tion for fiscal year 1975 averaged $326, and in the Courts of Appeals
averaged $712.18
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACr
While the Act is administered by the Courts, 19 the Judicial Conference
of the United States has continuing supervision over its operation and has
18 U.S.C. §3006A(a) (1970).
1228 U.S.C. §§2241, 2254 (1970).
1328 U.S.C. §2255 (1970) (federal prisoner's petition to vacate sentence).
118 U.S.C. §4245 (1970).
The Act was amended in 1974 to terminate coverage in the local courts in the District of
Columbia for the reason that Congress had enacted a separate bill providing for the equivalent
services in these courts. See U.S.C. §3006A (1) (Supp. V. 1975).
Further changes in the Act may come about as a result of the proposed recodification of the
federal criminal code, Title 18 of the United States Code, in a bill referred to as S.1. See S.1, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). However, as S.1 is presently drafted, the provisions for appointment of
attorneys and other services for persons financially unable to obtain adequate representation are
substantially the same as the provisions now in effect. See S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§101-05
(1973).
15As of July 31, 1976, the Administrative Office records reveal that in fiscal year 1975
(ending June 30, 1975), appointment of counsel was made for 47,039 persons.
161n addition, studies of attorneys' services rendered in fiscal year 1966 indicate that the
average time spent per case in the district court was nine hours, and 36 hours per appeal.
'7This sum understates the costs of providing services under the Act since it does not reflect
the $3 million appropriated separately for certain assigned attorneys in the District of Columbia
(which costs were paid under the Act until the 1974 amendment). See note 14, supra, & text
accompanying.
18The fiscal year 1975 figures are based on payment of claims in 83% of the cases in the
district courts and 66% of the cases in the courts of appeals.
19See 18 U.S.C. §3006A(g) (1970).
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promulgated national Guidelines to be followed by the courts.20 The
Guidelines deal with matters such as determination of eligibility, issues
regarding appointment of attorneys, contents of district court plans, and
forms which are to be used in administering the Act. A committee of the
Judicial Conference, known as the Committee to Implement the Criminal
Justice Act, makes recommendations to the Conference regarding changes
in the Guidelines and other issues which might arise in the operation of
the Act.
As provided in the Act, each of the ninety district courts, with the
approval of the appropriate circuit judicial council, placed in operation a
"plan" implementing the Act.2' Each circuit judicial council has supple-
mented the district court plans with provisions for representation for needy
defendants on appeal.
Funds for operation of the Act are appropriated yearly by Congress.
Payments are authorized by the courts and made by the Administrative
Office of the United States. 22
As a result, the Act has undergone some notable changes in its eleven
years of operation, largely seeking more effectively to protect the rights of
defendants and other persons in the federal criminal justice system.
Moreover, the district courts, by their interpretation of the Act as originally
passed, have created standards under which the Act operates. The
remainder of the article focuses in greater depth on the statutory and
judicial standards for the operation of the Act.
COVERAGE OF THE ACT: FINANCIAL ELIGIBILITY
From its inception, the Act has provided for assignment of counsel for
defendants who are "financially unable to obtain adequate representation."
There is, therefore, no requirement that a defendant be "indigent." 23 As set
forth by the Judicial Conference in its Guidelines for administration of the
Act, this test is met when a person's
2
°JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO
IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, GUIDELINES (Revised as of Sept. 16, 1974) (hereinafter
cited as GUIDELINES).
2 1These plans may be modified by the district court, subject to the approval of the
appropriate circuit judicial council. 18 U.S.C. §3006A(a) (1970).
2218 U.S.C. §3006A(j) (1970).23The determination of a defendant's financial need for an attorney or other services is
made by a magistrate or a district judge on the basis of affidavits submitted by the defendant.
This determination may be made at any stage in the proceedings, including on appeal, or after
the defendant has retained an attorney. Where necessary, a hearing may be held. 18 U.S.C.
§3006A(b) (1970). Conversely, if it is determined at any stage that the person for whom an
attorney was appointed or other services provided is financially able to obtain counsel or to
make partial payment for such representation or other services, the court may terminate the
appointment and/or direct payment of the fees by that person to the attorney, or, if payment has
been received by the attorney already, order repayment to the entity which made said payments
in the first instance. 18 U.S.C. §§3006A(c), (f) (1970).
[Vol. 52:135
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net financial resources and income are insufficient to enable him to obtain
qualified counsel. In determining whether such insufficiency exists,
consideration should be given to (a) the cost of providing the person and
his dependents with the necessities of life, and (b) the cost of a defendant's
bail bond if financial conditions are imposed, or the amount of the cash
deposit defendant is required to make to secure his release on bond.24
The Guidelines further provide that:
Any doubts as to a person's eligibility should be resolved in his favor;
erroneous determinations of eligibility may be corrected at a later time.2 5
In practice, this test of financial inability, rather than "indigency," has
been reflected in the defendants for whom the Act has provided counsel.
For example, of the 20,222 defendants who executed financial affidavits in
fiscal year 1967, 32% were employed and 45 of the defendants reported
weekly earnings of $200 or more.2 6
COVERAGE OF THE ACT: TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS
In passing the Act originally, Congress did not intend that appoint-
ment of attorneys at government expense should extend to all defendants
for whom the Supreme Court had ruled the Constitution requires the
assistance of counsel.27 In cases not covered by the Act, legal services were
provided by attorneys who performed the work pro bono publico or by
legal aid agencies. The Act covered repiesentation of defendants "in every
criminal case in which the'defendant is charged with a felony or a
misdemeanor, other than a petty offense" 28 at every stage of the proceedings
from "his initial appearance before the [magistrate] or court through
appeal. "29
The 1970 amendment expanded the Act's coverage in a number of
respects, making it coincide substantially with a person's constitutional
and statutory right to counsel. First, it expanded the time period for which
an attorney could be provided, extending the right to persons "under arrest,
when such representation is required by law." 30 In addition, under the Act
as amended in 1970, needy juveniles are entitled to appointed attorneys
2 4GUIDELINES, supra note 20, at Ch. II. A.4.
•5id.
261n order to insure continuous representation of defendants, most plans provide that an
attorney shall serve until relieved; shall advise a defendant of his right to appeal and to an
attorney on appeal, to be paid by the government, when necessary; and shall, if requested, file a
timely notice of appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1964).
27See James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325, 330-31 (5th Cir. 1969-; CONy. REP. No. 1709, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3000.
28In the federal criminal code, as currently drafted, a "petty offense" is a subcategory of
misdemeanor and is defined as an offense carrying a potential penalty of imprisonment of not
more than six months or a fine ok not more than $500, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970).
2918 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1970).
s"See generally Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966).
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when a right to counsel exists in those juvenile delinquency proceedings
which involve alleged commission of acts which, if committed by an adult,
would entitle that adult to the protection of the Act.3'
The 1970 amendment to the Act included a catch-all provision that an
attorney may be appointed for needy persons for whom "the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel3 2 or
for whom, in a case in which he faces loss of liberty, any Federal law
requires the appointment of counsel."3 3 Since Argersinger v. Hamlin,4 a
1972 Supreme Court case, this provision has had the effect of modifying the
restriction in the Act which precluded appointment of attorneys in petty
offense cases where the trial judge or magistrate leaves open the possibility
of imposition of a sentence of imprisonment.' 5 This provision also permits
appointment of attorneys in probation violation proceedings since the
Supreme Court has ruled in Mempa v. Rhay36 that there is a constitutional
right to counsel in such proceedings.
The 1970 amendment also gives the courts discretion, when the
"interests of justice" so require and a financial need is shown, to appoint
attorneys for persons subject to revocation of parole, 7 in custody as a
material witness, or seeking collateral relief, including writs of habeas
corpus and Section 22558 proceedings. Even though there is no constitu-
tional right to counsel under the sixth amendment in these civil proceed-
ings, this provision was included because there is substantial potential for
the deprivation of liberty.3 9
The Judicial Conference has determined that counsel may be appointed
for a person charged with civil contempt, or for a witness before a grand
jury who faces loss of liberty for failure to comply with an order of the
court.40 Payment of counsel under the Act, however, has not been allowed
in prisoner civil rights cases brought under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code.41
s1See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).3See generally Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 4253 (1970).
34407 U.S. 25 (1972).
ssSee 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(1) (1970); text accompanying note 28, supra.
The proposed provisions as to appointment of counsel in S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
largely retain these concepts but adopt new terminology for classification of offenses.
36389 U.S. 128 (1967).
s"See also notes 42-44, infra & test accompanying as to modification of the Act by the Parole
Commission & Reorganization Act of 1975.
3828 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) (petition by federal prisoner to vacate sentence).
s9See generally Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). These provisions are also
incorporated in the proposed bill S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
10See generally United States v. Sun Kung Kang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972); GUIDELINES,
supra note 20, at Ch. II.A.l.d(1), (2).
4 1GuiDELINES, supra note 20, at Ch. II.A.l.c(4). However it is possible that a prisoner in
custody may qualify for an appointed attorney if the court is satisfied that he erroneously and
out of ignorance brought the proceeding under section 1983. See Foley, supra note 2, at 16. in
addition, corporate defendants are not covered by the Act. GUIDELINS, supra note 20, at Ch.
II.A.l.c(2).
[Vol. 52:135
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As a result of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1975,42
which makes appointment of counsel mandatory in parole revocation
proceedings and detainer review or dispositional hearings and appeals, 43
the Judicial Conference will consider an amendment to the Guidelines to
provide for coverage of the Act in these proceedings when the parolee
desires legal assistance and is financially eligible.44
With the expanded coverage of the Act, the number of defendants for
whom counsel was appointed more than doubled between fiscal year 1967,
the first full fiscal year of the Act's operation, and fiscal year 1975, the last
full fiscal year for which statistics are available. 45
APPOINTMENT OF ATrORNEYS:
PANELS OF ATTORNEYS, FEDERAL PUBLIc DEFENDERS,
AND COMMUNITY DEFENDERS
As the Act was originally enacted, attorneys appointed for needy
defendants were either private attorneys or attorneys furnished by a bar
association or a legal aid agency. These arrangements satisfied the
statutory provision that "[c]ounsel shall be selected from, a panel of
attorneys designated or approved by the district court. '46
After several years of operation of the Act, Professor Oaks concluded in
his report to Congress that some districts did not have sufficient numbers of
lawyers able, willing, and experienced to provide adequate representation. 47
The Oaks Report strongly recommended "some type of full-time salaried
Federal defender lawyers [to be available for appointment as counsel] on an
optional basis, . . . especially in large urban districts." 48  Following
publication of the Oaks Report, Congress, by the 1970 amendment,
provided for establishment of Federal Public Defender and Community
Defender offices.
The Act continues to encourage substantial use of private attorneys. 49
42 Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 219 (Mar. 15, 1976), recodifying 18 U.S.C. §§4201 etseq. &5005
et seq. (1970).
4 Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2, 90 Stat. 228 (Mar. 15, 1976) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
4214(a)(2)(B), 4214(b) & 4214(c)).
44See REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE COMMITTEE TO-
IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT (Sept. 1976). Appointment of counsel in parole
termination proceedings under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1975,
however, is still thought to be discretionary, but the opinion of the Comptroller General is
being sought. See Pub. L. No. 94-233, § 2.90 Stat. 227 (Mar. 15, 1976) (to be codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4211(c)).45See note 15, supra, & iext accompanying.
4618 U.S.C. 3006A(b) (1970). The Congressional conferees compromised in passing the
original Act by deleting from the Senate version of the bill the provision for a system of public
defenders. See note 9 supra.
47 Oaks Report note 7, at 11, 117-57.481d. at 11.
4918 U-S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970). The Judicial Conference has directed that in those districts
having defender organizations of any type, private counsel shall be assigned to at least twenty-
five percent of the persons annually requiring repesentation under the Act.
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However, the courts have also been empowered to establish defender
organizations in districts where at least 200 persons annually require the
appointment of counsel. 50 The defender organization may consist of a
"Federal Public Defender" who would be a full-time salaried attorney
appointed for a four year term by the judicial council of the circuit as a
non-civil service appointee. The "Federal Public Defender" would have an
office of full-time attorneys organizationally modeled after the United
States Attorneys' offices. 5' Alternatively, the defender organization may
consist of a "Community Defender" office operated by a non-profit group
recognized by the court and financed either through initial and/or
sustaining grants as approved by the Judicial Conference. A district may
have either a Federal Public Defender or a Community Defender office, or
both.52 There are presently twenty-two Federal Public Defender offices 5
and nine Community Defender offices5 4 operating around the country.
In fiscal year 1976, approximately thirty-five percent of the 47,000
persons represented in the United States courts under the Act were
represented by attorneys from Federal Public Defenders or Community
Defenders offices. 55
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS UNDER THE ACr
The Act originally provided for a maximum hourly rate of $15 for
attorneys' time expended in court and a maximum of *$10 per hour for time
"reasonably" expended out of court.5 6  These maxima were set in
conformity with the 1963 Allen Report recommendations as rates which
were the "lowest statutory limit[s] consistent with the objectives of
reasonable compensation for the assigned lawyer and adequate representa-
tion." 57  Compensation for attorneys' services under the Act was not
s518 U.S.C. §3006A(h)(1) (1970). Alternatively, two adjacent districts or parts of districts
may aggregate the number of persons represented. However, no district or portion thereof has
availed itself of the benefits of this provision.
5118 U.S.C. § 3006A(h)(2)(A) (1970).
5218 U.S.C. § 3006A(h)(2)(B) (1970).
"
3The Federal Public Defenders offices are located in .the districts of: Arizona; California
(Northern, Eastern & Central); Colorado; Connecticut; Florida; Kansas; Kentucky (Eastern);
Louisiana (Eastern); Maryland; Missouri; Nevada; New Jersey; New Mexico; Ohio; Penn-
;ylvania (Western); Tennessee (Western); Texas (Southern & Western); Virgin Islands; and
Washington (Western).54The Community Defenders offices are located in Georgia (Northern); Illinois (Northern);
Michigan (Eastern); Minnesota; New York (Southern & Eastern); Oregon; Pennsylvania
(Eastein); California (Southern).55These figures are from Administrative Office Reports made to the Judicial Conference
Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act and have been updated by the Administra-
tion Office Staff, James E. Macklin, Jr., Chief Criminal Justice Act Division, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.56See Pub. L. No. 84-455, 78 Stat. 553 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1)
(1970). An award of compensation is to be made by the court on the basis of a written statement
by the attorney "specifying the time expended, services rendered, and expenses incurred."
5 7ALLEN REPORT, supra note 3, at 42. See OAKs REPORT, supra note 7, at 170.
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intended to be at a rate comparable to fees charged in private practice.
Rather, the theory under the Act was to provide modest reimbursement for
professional services rendered by lawyers dedicated to serving the public
interest.
In amending the Act in 1970, Congress adhered to this philosophy,58 but
raised the maximum rates to $30 per hour for an attorney's in-court time
and $20 per hour for out-of-court time.59
COMPENSATION IN ExcEss OF THE STATUTORY MAXIMA
In addition to the maximum hourly rates established by the Act,
Congress set overall maximum amounts which may be paid on behalf of a
defendant in a single case. The maximum compensation for a case
involving one or more felonies was originally set at $500.60
In the 1970 amendment to the Act, in accordance with the Oaks Report
recommendations, Congress raised the total maximum compensation for
representation of a defendant at the district court level to $1,000 "for each
attorney" per case in which one or more felonies are charged, and $400 for
each attorney per case in which only misdemeanors are charged. For
appellate work, the maximum was set at $1,000 for each attorney per case.
On post-trial motions, which only came within the Act by reason of the
1970 amendment, the maximum was set at $250 for each attorney in each
proceeding in each court.6'
The Act, both as originally passed and as amended, has provided for
payments to attorneys in excess of these statutory maxima in specified
circumstances. 62  Originally, the Act provided that in "extraordinary
circumstances," "payment in excess of the limits stated.., could be made
[for services rendered in the district court] if the district court certified that
such payment [was] necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted
representation, and the amount [was] approved by the chief judge of the
circuit. '63 A determination of what constituted "extraordinary circum-
stances" was left to the various judges at both the district and appellate
court levels. Some courts found guidance in the legislative history of the
'sSee S. ReP. No. 91-790, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
5918 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(l) (1970).60See Pub. L. No. 84-455, 78 Stat. 553 (1964) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2)
(1970)). When 'the case involved only misdemeanors, the maximum was $300. Moreover, for
services rendered in an appellate court, an attorney's compensation could "in no event exceed
$500 in a felony case and $300 in a case involving only misdemeanors." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)
(1964).
6118 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (1970).
6218 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1970).
63Pub. L. No. 84-455, 70 Stat. 553 (1964). The standard was changed by -the 1970
amendment; excess compensation can now be awarded when the district court finds the
representation to have been "extended or complex" and the amount of the excess payment "is
necessary to provide fair compensation." Then, as before the amendment, the payment must be
approved by the chief judge of the circuit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1970).
1976]
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Act. In the House version, recovery in excess of $500 was not allowed
under any circumstances, 64 while in the Senate version 6 no limit on an
attorney's compensation was imposed. In the Conference Committee, in
exchange for inclusion of the $500 limit per case, it was agreed that appeals
would be treated as separate cases from proceedings in the district courts,
and that exceptions to the maximum compensation provisions could be
made in cases involving "protracted representation" in the "cases of
extremely long duration. ' 66 Notwithstanding, many of the chief judges of
the circuits in ruling on specific applications noted that they lacked
guidance in interpreting the terms "extraordinary circumstances" and
"protracted representation." From the few written decisions addressing the
issue, the judges appear to have used a variety of factors, such as the nature
of the case, the length of trial, and the amount and purpose of time spent
both in and out of court. For example, some of the applications were
rejected because the trials were less than six days long and therefore did not
satisfy the "protracted representation" requirement. 67
In passing the 1970 amendment, Congress changed the standard for
excess compensation. The district judge now must find that the representa-
tion was "extended or complex" and that the amount of excess compensa-
tion awarded is "necessary to provide fair compensation.1 6 Accordingly,
by eliminating the finding of "extraordinary circumstances," Congress
simplified the eligibility requirements for making excess compensation
awards.69 Nevertheless, the courts have encountered some difficulty in
determining what criteria are to be used for evaluation of applications.
64H.R. 7457, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
65S.1057, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
6"See CONE. REP. No. 1709,88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws 3002.
67See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 311 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (D.D.C. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J.);
United States v. Hanrahan, 260 F. Supp. 728 (D.D.C. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J.); United States v.
Owens, 66 Cr. 48 (W.D. Pa., filed July 25, 1966) (Staley, C.J.); United States v. Moore, 258 F.
Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1966) (Bazelon, C.J.); United States v. Whimey, 65 Cr. 160 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Mar. 30, 1966) (Lumbard, C.J.); United States v. Dodge, 260 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(Lumbard, C.J.); United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234 (D. Neb. 1966).
In fiscal year 1966, 128 claims for excess compensation were approved, with an average
payment of $1,204 per case. In fiscal year 1970, 152 claims for excess compensation were
approved and the payments averaged $1,368. In that year, 356 claims were denied in the district
courts. These figures are from Administrative Office Reports made to the Judicial Conference
Committee to Implement the Criminal Justice Act and have been updated by the Administra-
tion Office Staff, James E. Macklin, Jr., Chief, Criminal Justice Act Division, Administrative
Office of ihe United States Courts. There were no statistics available on the number of
applications certified by the district courts to the chief judge of the circuits and then denied by
the latter. Note also that each of the claims reported here involved representation of a defendant
on felony charges. There appear to have been no claims for excess compensation on
misdemeanor cases.68See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 394 F. Supp. 997 (D.D.C. 1975) (Brazelon, C.J.).
In addition, each payment of excess compensation, must, as before the amendment, be
approved by the chief judge of the circuit.
69See S. REP. No. 91-790, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 14-15 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1546, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3982.
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There is some desire among certain judges and administrators to establish
guidelines to afford greater uniformity among districts and judges' rulings
on applications. Others strongly argue, on the other hand, that no
guidelines could be devised which would take into account the multitude
of variables involved in these decisions.
Notwithstanding the theory of compensation under the Act, that the
fees awarded are not intended to fully compensate attorneys for the time
devoted, there is a growing opinion, as expressed by Chief Judge Bazelon,
that the awards are inadequate. The failure to award adequate compensa-
tion to experienced and competent counsel in appropriate cases is
"deter[ring] competent counsel from accepting appointments in extended
or complex criminal cases, lower[ing] the quality of the defense services
provided to individual defendants, and run[ning] a risk of driving the
experienced practitioner from the criminal courts while discouraging
young attorneys from pursuing a career in criminal litigation." 70
In addition to the necessary finding that the representation was
"extended or complex," the district court, subject to the approval of the
chief judge of the circuit, must determine what would be "fair compensa-
tion" for the services rendered. There appear to be basically three
approaches taken by the chief judges of the circuits in making this
determination: some apply the statutory maximum hourly rates to the
times "reasonably expended;"71 others use a schedule of payments often
based at least in part on the quality of the attorney's performance;72 and
one circuit applies an automatic reduction of ten percent or more to the
claimed compensation, attributing the cut to "public service."3
Another issue being raised in connection with application for com-
pensation under the Act is the definition of time "reasonably expended."
There is difficulty in making consistent awards when a lawyer unfamiliar
with criminal practice expends significantly more hours than an exper-
ienced practitioner would need to complete a given task. One approach is
to use as a yardstick the lawyer of "ordinary competence," 74 but even that is
only a subjective standard which affords minimal guidance.
The standard for granting excess compensation adopted in the 1970
amendmeni appears to have enabled more attorneys to qualify for such
70United States v. Hunter, 394 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (D.D.C. 1975).
7'District of Columbia, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Chief Judge
Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit has referred to the concept of "reasonable attorneys'
fees" in civil cases. The information contained in this note and notes 72, 73, and 74, infra, is
based on correspondence between the author and judges of the other circuits. Copies of these
letters are on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL.
72First, Second, Fifth and Eighth Circuits. See note 71 supra.
7"Third Circuit. The Second Circuit approach is similar in the sense that when considering
applications for excess compensation, the hourly compensation rate is decreased by one-third-
from the maximum permissible per hour until the total compensation reaches the normal
maximum permitted (e.g., $1,000 for a felony trial). Above that level, the attorney may be
compensated at the maximum hourly rates. See note 71 supra.
74District of Columbia Circuit. See note 71 supra.
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treatment. As compared to 128 claims approved in fiscal year 1966 and 152
claims approved in fiscal year 1970,75 in fiscal year 1975, 372 claims for
excess compensation were approved in felony cases alone. These awards
averaged about $2,881 per case. In addition, in fiscal year 1975, there were
115 claims approved for compensation in excess of $250 which were for
services rendered pursuant to discretionary appointments.76
INVESTIGATIVE, EXPERT AND OTHER SERVICES
In addition to services by counsel, the Act provides that an attorney for
a person "who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte
application. ' 77 These services may be obtained under the Act upon a
showing of financial need without regard to a person's ability to afford an
attorney.
In the Act as originally drafted, these services were available upon
application prior to making the expenditure. Ratification by the court of
the expenditure after it was made was also possible upon application by
defendant if the court found "that timely procurement of necessary services
could not await prior authorization." The Act authorized payment of
"reasonable compensation" for such services, but a maximum was imposed
of $300, exclusive of expenses "reasonably incurred." There was no
provision for payment in excess of the $300 maximum.
The 1970 amendment to the Act clarified the procedures for obtaining
other services and changed the maximum payments permitted, If the
request is made prior to the expenditure, then compensation of uf to $300,
exclusive of expenses "reasonably incurred," is authorized by the Act upon
approval by the court.7 8 Payment in excess of that limit may be made if
certified to the court as being necessary to provide fair compensation for
services of an unusual character of duration, and the amount of the excess
payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit.79 If no prior request
is made for such services, payment nevertheless may be made as compensa-
tion in an amount up to $150 plus reasonable expenses. The Act does not
include a requirement that there be any special showing in order to utilize
this provision.
Careful guidelines have been prescribed by the Judicial Conference
establishing what expenditures may be charged under this provision of the
Act. Compensation has been provided under this provision for services
rendered by investigators, appraisers, interpreters, doctors, psychiatrists,
75See note 67 supra.76See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1970).
7718 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1970).
7818 U.S.C, § 3006A(e)(1) (1970).
7918 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3) (1970).
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handwriting and fingerprint experts, among others. However, the appoint-
ed attorney's office overhead, and clothing and transportation for the
defendant, for example, are not reimbursable under the Act.
Certain specific expenses are not covered by the Act since they are
already provided for by other statutes. For example, payment of witness
fees and costs of subpoenas for a witness "necessary to an adequate defense"
of a defendant "financially unable to pay the fees" is to be borne by the
Department of Justice under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. However, payment of expenses of depositions is to be made out
of funds appropriated for the Act, at least insofar as expert witnesses are
deposed by a financially needy defendant.
The costs of other services have risen dramatically since the Act was
passed. For instance, payments for these services for fiscal years 1966, 1967,
and 1968 aggregated $25,786, $46,017 and $58,500, respectively, as compared
to approximately $408,800 for fiscal year 1975 and an estimated $550,000 for
the fiscal year 1976. Transcripts, not included in the foregoing figures,
have become the single most expensive item furnished under the Act.
Payments for transcripts authorized for fiscal years 1966, 1967 and 1968
aggregated $190,317, $270,703 and $397,552, respectively. In fiscal year
1975, transcript costs were $1,353,993 and they are expected to show an
increase of another 40 percent, thus reaching $1.9 million in fiscal year
1976.80
Another current concern is the increase in the cost of interpreters for
defendants during trials. These costs have risen 147 percent between fiscal
years 1975 and 1976. There is also a question as to whether the provision
for interpreters included simultaneous "United Nations-type" translation.
This type of translation will be more expensive in single-defendant trials,
but possibly less expensive than numerous individual interpreters in an
extended multi-defendant trial where a number of defendants need transla-
tion services.
CONCLUSION
In a democracy such as the United States, every criminal defendant is
entitled to a fair trial and protection of his constitutional rights. Prior to
passage of the Criminal Justice Act, the devices used to guarantee
representation were simply inadequate for the proper representation of
needy defendants. While the ideal of fair representation for all defendants
has not been fully achieved, the Criminal Justice Act constitutes a
significant step forward by making attorneys and other services available
for defendants otherwise unable to obtain them. Although the administra-
tion of the Act is an expensive proposition, the expense is necessary to
provide competent legal assistance to the large group of needy, though not
ROSee note 67 supra.
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necessarily indigent defendants who are unable to afford the cost of an
adequate defense. The Act is therefore one step toward "that great day
when the kind of trial a person gets will not depend on the amount of
money he has, or the accident of birth."8'
8
'Address by Chief Judge Bazelon, "The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger," Annual
Conference, National Legal Aid and Defender Association (Nov. 13, 1975), reprinted in 33
NLADA BRIEFCASE 57 (1976).
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